Introduction
During the past decade, unconventional gas development (UGD) has revolutionized the U.S. energy sector. In both 2012 and 2013 the U.S. outpaced Russia in natural gas production for the first time in modern history.' The U.S. is now projected to become a net exporter of natural gas in the foreseeable future and the Obama administration has already approved several large new export terminals for liquefied natural gas. As a consequence of UGD in the U.S. and Canada, the traditional producer-consumer relations in global energy markets are chang-enhanced competitiveness of European industry, 5 the Commission has issued only voluntary guidelines on UGD.6 EU member states retain the power to encourage, permit, restrict, or prohibit UGD, and those policies are variable and often quite restrictive.
France and Bulgaria have prohibited UGD. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, Poland and sever al other eastern European countries are supportive of UGD and are initiating development activities. Ger many is working on a regulation that seeks to ban unconventional gas production on a commercial scale until 2021, while allowing small-scale pilot projects that contribute to relevant scientific research. 7 The upcoming regulation, however, still allows conventional fracking that has been practiced in Germany since the 1960s.
International agencies and European officials of ten refer to the experience in the U.S. as if the U.S. government is a single political entity that is univer sally supportive of UGD. It is certainly true that both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama and their administrations have been highly supportive of UGD. However, international perceptions of U.S. policy often overlook the fact that the U.S. is a federal political system where the main authority for oil and gas development regulation lies with each of the fifty states.
There is in fact vast heterogeneity among the states with regard to the extent of UGD. In this paper we explore how and why the magnitude and pace of UGD differ in selected U.S. states. We advance eight hy
5
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the exploration and production of hydrocarbons (such as shale gas) using high volume hydraulic fracturing in the EU, COM(2014) 23, at p. 4.
6
Commission Recommendations of 22 January 2014 on minimum principles for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons (such as shale gas) using high-volume hydraulic fracturing, 2014/40/EU.
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BMUB, "Oberblick uber die geplante "Fracking"-Regelung", 4 Juli 2014, available on the Internet at <http://www.bmub.bund.de/ themen/wasser-abfall-boden/binnengewaesser/fracking -regelung/> (last accessed on August 4 2014). See also UBA, "Umweltauswirkungen von Fracking bei der Aufsuchung und Gewinnung von Erdgas insbesondere aus Schiefergaslagerst5tten. Teil 2 -Grundwassermonitoringkonzept, Frackingchemikalienkataster, Entsorgung von Flowback, Forschungsstand zur Emissions-und Klimabilanz, induzierte Seismizit5t, Naturhaushalt, Landschaftsbild und biologische Vielfalt", (Dessau-Roglau, UBA: 2014). potheses that may help explain the variation in shale gas production. A set of technical, social, economic and political attributes from each of the selected states is presented to explore the explanatory power of the eight hypotheses. This article contributes to our understanding of the drivers of shale gas development and aims at raising our European audience's awareness of the considerable variability of shale gas development in the U.S. states. The insights from our hypothesis development and case studies may be fruitfully applied to future research of UGD in the Canadian and European contexts.
Research design and methods of analysis
We define UGD as the development of unconventional gas reservoirs using a combination of advanced drilling and completion technologies that include multi-stage hydraulic fracturing together with horizontal drilling. The term "fracking" is used in this ar ticle as a synonym for UGD, although the term is sometimes used to refer only to hydraulic fracturing. Our primary focus is shale gas development, though we note Colorado's large commitment to coalbed methane (CBM) and there are some other forms of UGD (e.g., tight gas plays). We address the variation of UGD using measures of the magnitude and pace of UGD in each state. The time period that we focus on is justified by the availability of data on shale gas production and extends from 2007 until 2012, covering most of the period since the breakthroughs by George Mitchell and competitors revolutionized the oil and gas industry. 8 We operationalize 'the magnitude of unconventional gas development' as a cumulative amount of unconventional gas produced from 2007 until 2012 and the 'pace' as the average year over year change of unconventional gas production between 2007 and 2012 (see Table 1 ). Eight specific U.S. states were selected for analysis: California, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. All of these states have geological potential for UGD but differ substantially in the magnitude and pace of UGD. Fur ther, the selected states account for the majority of the U.S. unconventional gas reserves and the vast majority of unconventional gas production in the U.S. We categorized the eight states into three groups + Source of data for shale gas wells: EIA, "Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production. Gross Withdrawals from Shale Gas Wells", 2014, available on the Internet at: <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng-prod-sum-a_EPGO_FGS_mmcfa.htm> (last accessed on July 14 2014).
t Source of data for coalbed wells: ELA, "Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production. Gross Withdrawals from Coalbed Wells", 2014, available on the Internet at: <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng-prod-sum-a_EPGOFGC-mmcf a.htm> (last accessed on July 24 2014).
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based on their level and pace of UGD (see Table 1 ).
1) Texas and Pennsylvania are considered to have
high levels of UGD: * Cumulative gross withdrawals for each of the two states exceeded one trillion cubic feet (tcf) during the time period under study. * Both states have experienced an increasing pace of production.
2) Colorado, Michigan and Ohio are considered to have medium levels of UGD: * Cumulative gross withdrawals for each of the three states exceeded one billion cubic feet (bcf) during the time period under study. * The states in this group show a varying pace of UGD -whereas Ohio shows fast growth in shale gas production, Colorado's production started decreasing from around 2010, and Michigan shows a continuously falling rate of UGD. * Note that Colorado's cumulative production is larger than Pennsylvania's because we account for Colorado's large amount of CBM production. Currently, Colorado is the seventh largest gas producer in the United States, contains the third largest gas reserves, and boasts the largest CBM reserves in the nation. 3) New York, California, and Illinois are considered to have low levels of UGD. Between 2007 and 2012 each of these states produced negligible amounts of unconventional gas that are not even included in the database of the Energy Information Administration (EIA), our primary source of energy data. As such, it was not possible to calculate the change of production for these states, though informal consultations confirm that few investments in UGD are being made in these states.
The hypotheses for explaining variation are drawn from our discussions with UGD practitioners from industry and government as well as from the social science literature on technological risk, regulation, and innovation. The informal discussions occurred 9 Colorado Geological Survey, "Energy Resources -Natural Gas", available on the Internet at <http://coloradogeologicalsurvey.org/ energy-resources/natural-gas/> (last accessed on 8 May 2014). A significant amount of proven unconventional gas reserves -the commercially and technically recover able part of a resource -is a necessary condition for investment in UGD. Although all states selected for this study have the geological potential for UGD, we hypothesize that the magnitude and pace of UGD will vary with the amount of proven unconventional gas reserves. In this context it is necessary to highlight a relation of mutual dependence between production and reserves: increasing production often leads to better data about the geological characteristics and size of the reservoirs, enabling greater production to take place. In order to account for this hypothesis, we specify the amount of proven natural gas reserves from shale for each state in our sample.
H2 (Infrastructure):
A state is more likely to reach a high level of UGD if the state has access to infrastructure that is required for viable UGD.
The inputs necessary for UGD are not limited to the land where well sites are located and drilling occurs, as developers need access to other key infrastructur al elements to support exploration and production. We focus on material supplies, collecting data on water availability, pipeline and underground gas-stor age data for 2008 -the year that precedes large-scale UGD in most U.S. states.
An extensive intra-and interstate pipeline infrastructure is of crucial importance to deliver gas to markets, refineries and LNG terminals (if export of gas is envisioned). Since pipeline construction is capital and time intensive, we assume that states with access to a gathering and transmission pipeline infrastructure will be more conducive to UGD than states without such access. Underground gas storage capacity is closely linked to the availability of the pipelines, since the underground storage is important to balance the load and, in the case of the intrastate pipelines, to facilitate the end customer supply. 1 We also highlight the availability of water because it is a critical infrastructural requirement for UGD. While water requirements differ depending on the geological formation being fractured, an estimated 2.5 million gallons of water on average is required per well.
1 2 We collect data on percentage of wells in high or extremely high water stressed areas to assess the relation between water scarcity and UGD for each state. We examine whether states with a high per centage of wells in water stress areas have lower levels of UGD relative to states with a lower percentage of wells in such areas.
H3 (History):
A state is more likely to reach a high level of UGD if the state has a recent history of conventional gas development.
Drawing from the concept of "technological trajectory" in the evolutionary economics literature, we assume that a recent history of conventional gas development may influence the structure of a state's economy such that a path-dependency develops for similar or related technologies. 13 Further, a recent historyof conventional gas development implies that close interactions between existing technological systems and governing institutions facilitate the application of established regulatory regimes, standard operating procedures, and experienced agency professionals to UGD. 1 4 Moreover, risk perception literature indicates that familiarity with the technology tends to facilitate acceptance, and UGD may be perceived as similar to conventional development. 15 Previous research highlighted considerable effects of energy dominated policy subsystems in the states with a history of conventional gas development. 1 6 For all of these reasons, UGD is likely to be encouraged in a state with a recent history of conventional gas production.
For each of the states we consider, we specify the magnitude of conventional natural gas production in at least the last twenty years, which we consider recent production. This hypothesis focuses on the regulatory environment that can facilitate or restrict development. As UGD is a type of natural gas development, the regulation applicable to natural gas extraction also applies to UGD. However, the specifics of the UGD technol- ogy potentially require a separate set of rules. We ar gue that those regulatory frameworks that treat UGD as being not fundamentally different than conventional oil and gas extraction create more favorable regulatory regimes since they allow the same permitting procedure and institutional rules to apply to UGD. Those familiar rules may enhance the confidence of investors in UGD and accelerate the process of permitting. The opposite approach stresses the uniqueness of UGD and requires that it be subjected to new environmental and/or human health impact assessments. An entirely new regulatory system for UGD may also be required, since it is seen as a new technology, and this may increase investor uncertainty and slow down the process of permitting. For our study we collect information on regulatory frameworks in eight states, focusing on whether or not UGD is treated as an extension of UGD.
H4 (Party):

H7 (Economic distress):
A state is more likely to reach a high level of UGD if the state's economy is in distress.
A key argument made in favor of UGD relates to job creation and the associated benefits for the economies of the affected communities and states.
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The "highly decentralized" nature of shale gas wells means that communities in a state will vary considerablyin their direct contact with UGD. 2 0 We assume that states whose economies are in greater distress are more likely to seek UGD as a measure to stimulate the state's economy and thus develop policies that are supportive of UGD.
In order to address this hypothesis we collect
2008-2012 data at two levels of analysis -state and county. First, we compare each state's economic conditions with the U.S. average, focusing on median household income, the rate of unemployment, and the rate of poverty in the state. Then, we compare economic conditions of individual counties that pursue UGD, or that can potentially pursue UGD (due to favorable geology), with the statewide average. If the counties in which UGD is currently taking place (or can potentially take place) are in greater economic distress, then we hypothesize that those counties may be receptive to UGD and thus state-level politicians may be inclined to defer to their economic interests.
H8 (Public opinion):
A state is more likely to reach a high level of UGD if public opinion is supportive of UGD.
Previous public opinion research shows low levels of public awareness and familiarity, uncertain attitudes, and low levels of knowledge about UGD among the general public in the U.S. 2 1 The research also indicates that public awareness of UGD is somewhat higher in the states where development oc- curs.22 We examine the relation between public attitudes and the level of UGD by drawing from the numerous surveys of public opinion on UGD that were carried out in 2010-2013 in the selected states.
Although we have advanced each hypothesis by itself, the hypotheses are not intended to be mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Indeed, a single hypothesis cannot explain the full extent of variation in UGD from state to state. Thus, we fully expect multiple explanations for the variation in the status of UGD. Fur ther, we refrain from claiming a causal relation between our primary dependent variable -the level of UGD -and the explanatory variables posited in our hypotheses. Our goal is to highlight the historical, technical, economic, political and societal conditions of these U.S. states and explore their relations with the diffusion of one type of emerging energy technology -UGD.
IV. Analysis
Drawing from the data on the attributes of the eight states, we discuss the explanatory power of the hy potheses. The conclusion summarizes the research results and considers the applicability of the findings to the EU context.
Reserves
The focus on reserves 2 3 draws our attention to the economics of shale gas development. Indeed, technically recoverable unconventional gas does not necessarily mean that the development will be economically viable. We consider the reserves that exceed 1000 bcf to be large, and that below io bcf to be small. The available data on six of the eight states (TX, PA, CO, NY, OH, CA) support our hypothesis about a relation between the level of UGD and the magnitude of the reserves (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section).
The states with high levels of UGD (TX, PA) possess by far the richest reserves of unconventional gas (see Table 2 ). Conversely, the less abundant shale gas reserves in California correspond with a low level of development. Moreover, a recent report on shale gas reserves in New York State concluded that at current natural gas prices -$4.oo/MMBtu -no area of the Marcellus formation in New York can be considered commercially viable. The negligible amount of natural gas production in Illinois may reflect a lack of estimation of reserves (i.e., no concerted exploratory drilling effort has been made to evaluate the resource and tailor the technology to its production). Moreover, no natural gas liquids have been found in the Illinois basin to date, and those liquids generally enhance the prof itability of UGD. Overall, Crockett and Morse highlight the low level of maturity of the New Albany play in Illinois as an important factor inhibiting production.
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The circumstance in California is somewhat similar. While the Monterrey Shale has been a prolific producer of hydrocarbons for decades, exploiting it as an unconventional reservoir for gas has yet to take place. A recent study has caused the EIA to down- Michigan highlights the importance of shale gas economics: despite the state's considerable reserves and a rich history of oil and gas development, low prices in the U.S. natural gas market drove Michigan's shale gas production downward. This is partially due to the fact that the gas is dry, and thus the added incentive of producing natural gas liquids is not present.
Ohio has a similar amount of reserves as Michigan, yet the superior economics of shale gas development in Ohio's Utica Shale, specifically the presence of significant amounts of accompanying liquids, is contributing to a rapidly increasing rate of production.
Infrastructure
Our data lead to mixed results on the relationship between the level of UGD and the availability of infrastructure. In general, we offer some evidence to sup- port the relationship, but the cases of Michigan, Illinois and California show that the availability of infrastructure is not a sufficient precondition for successful development (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section). High levels of UGD in Texas and Pennsylvania cor respond with high pipeline mileage and large natur al gas underground storage capacities available in both states (see Table 3 ). The spread of shale gas production in Texas benefitted from the existing infrastructure for conventional production. Historically, Pennsylvania was the hub of a substantial gas-producing region that covered West Virginia, Ohio, and southwestern Pennsylvania. Thus, the incipient UGD industry benefitted from this legacy.
Ohio has modest amounts of natural gas pipelines and underground storage. As we hypothesize, this corresponds with a low amount of cumulative shale gas withdrawals between 2007 and 2012. Indeed, pipelines and processing plants were identified as the main barriers to increased production in Ohio's Utica Shale play.
2 7 As a response, companies spent or have committed more than $6 billion on midstream infrastructure to bring the product to the mar ket, resulting in a leap of production from 2012 to 2013.28 Thus, production is estimated to be 300 to 6oo bcf for 2013 and possibly much more than this in the following years as infrastructure needed to convey products to market is completed. New York possesses low pipeline mileage and underground storage. This situation is consistent with the hypothesis. The hypothesis is contradicted in four Similarly, Michigan has a high level of infrastructure, but only a modest amount of development. By contrast, Colorado has a low amount of infrastructure but relatively high production, albeit with a falling production rate (see Table 1 ). About 40% of Colorado's natural gas production is CBM, which requires substantially less water than shale gas development.
2 9 The diminished need for water in CBM extraction may help explain why Colorado is a major UGD producing state, despite the fact that 97% of development is sited in high or extremely high water stress areas (see Table 3 ). Further, competition for water resources between counties is a major challenge in all states, and especially in Colorado where 89% of water used in fracking occurs in two counties Weld and Garfield.
3 0 Additionally, most UGD in Michigan and California is projected for high or extremely high water stress areas, which may ultimately constrain production capabilities in both states.
Texas has relatively few wells in high or very high water stress areas (52%) and the wells are more widely distributed than in Colorado. However, fracking is projected to double in Texas in the next decade, which may increase the number of water stressed areas that concurrently experience a rapid increase in population. Two thirds of the state regularly experiences drought conditions. Pennsylvania has a very small percentage of wells in high or very high water stress areas. Roughly 6o% of wells are sited in areas with medium water stress.
3 2 Also, a very small proportion of Ohio-less than 5% of the state-experiences high water stress. 3 While this area rests on shale plays, we assume that the chances of siting wells on this area is relatively low given that the eastern two-thirds of the state is geographically amendable to UGD.
Although there is little evidence that New York and Illinois face high water stress, they may be rela- 
History
The relation between a recent history of conventional gas development and UGD holds for most of the analyzed states, especially in states on both ends of the development spectrum (TX and NYS/IL). Although the analysis of the states with medium level of development produced more nuanced insights, in general, the relation between the amount of UGD and recent history of conventional natural gas development holds (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section).
High level of UGD in Texas corresponds with the rich recent history of conventional gas production. As hypothesized, low levels of UGD in New York and Illinois correspond with the lack of recent history of conventional gas development.
Ohio has had a long but inconsistent history of oil and gas development. The state produced little nat-34 EIA, "Ohio Natural Gas Marketed Production", 30 April 2014, available on the Internet at <www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/ n905Ooh2a.htm> (last accessed on 8 May 2014). Colorado has a rich history of conventional production, which corresponds with a high cumulative amount of unconventional gas produced so far. Michigan has a consistent recent history of natural gas development and is recorded to have used the practice of hydraulic fracturing -typically with ver tical drilling -for over 50 years. 35 The analysis, however, does not explain the falling unconventional gas production in Michigan and Colorado. In California, hydraulic fracturing is generally used to produce oil rather than natural gas. Califor nia has a rich history of oil production, but the production of both crude oil and natural gas have declined over the past 25 years.
3 6 Hydraulic fracturing has been used in California for years to ensure maximum productivity of oil from the Monterey via conventional wells but this recent history of production has not been accompanied by UGD. The case of Pennsylvania is a striking exception that demonstrates that a state can multiply its natural gas production from virtually non-existent to the top level within a very short period of time.
Party
By examining party politics in state Governor's of fices and state legislatures from 2007-2013, we find that the hypothesis is largely supported for the data in our sample (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section). Texas and Pennsylvania are both supportive of UGD and have had Republican Party control for the majority of UGD development. Texas has had strong and consistent Republic Party control of the legislature and Governor's office in 2007-2012. Although UGD expanded considerably during Republican Governor Tom Corbett's tenure in Pennsylvania (2011-2014), a period that also witnessed Republican control of the Pennsylvania legislature, the development of the state's unconventional gas industry began under the previous Governor, Ed Rendell, who is a Democrat.
Colorado does not support the hypothesis, as the state has a strong UGD industry, but has had two consecutive Democratic Governors from 2007 to present. Diverging from the party line, the current Democra- The case of Michigan does not support the hypothesis since the recent Republican control of both the legislature and Governor's office did not reverse the continuously falling production.
In Ohio, the Republican Governor John Kasich, while supportive of increasing UGD in the state, took a proactive approach by advocating more stringent regulation of UGD that was enacted in 2012. The case of Ohio supports our hypothesis, since the Republican control of legislature and Governor's office coincides with a rapid increase in UGD.
Illinois and New York have a consistent history of Democratic majorities in their respective legislatures and Governors' offices, and only negligible amounts of UGD. California also supports our hypothesis, since its legislature was controlled by the Democratic Party during the time period under study whereas, until 2010, it had a Republican Governor.
Analysis of the "Party"-hypothesis is complicated by the recent policy positions of Democratic Gover nors in California (Jerry Brown) and Illinois (Pat Quinn). Both Governors opposed legislative prohibitions of UGD and instead have strived to permit UGD under stringent regulatory conditions that would ensure safety and public trust.
Environmental sentiment
The evidence is mixed on the relationship between a state's environmental sensitivity and UGD. For states at the extremes of UGD (TX and NYS/CA), the hypothesis is supported but the story is somewhat more complicated for the other states (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section).
The average pro-environment scores in Pennsylvania are at the low end of the eight states, which is consistent with the state's high level of UGD (see Table 4 ). Moreover, Pennsylvania's scores have gradually declined, both in the Senate and the House, in precisely the period when rising levels of UGD were recorded. The average scores in Ohio are even lower than in Pennsylvania (which may help explain why 0 EJRR 4|2014 a rapid increase in UGD has been tolerated) but they do not explain why Ohio's development occurred af ter Pennsylvania.
Our hypothesis is somewhat contradicted by the evidence from Colorado and Michigan. Colorado's score pattern resembles that of Illinois, suggesting similar and strong environmental sensitivity. Yet, UGD is robust in Colorado and negligible in Illinois. Michigan's scores are considerably higher in the Senate than in the House, which makes any relation with UGD difficult to discern. High environmental scores in both states might help account for falling production rates in Michigan and Colorado.
Regulation
Our data mostly supports the hypothesis -those states with high or medium levels of UGD (TX, PA, CO, MI, and OH) simply extended existing oil and gas regulation to UGD during the time period under study. States with low levels of UGD (NY, IL, CA) designated UGD as a distinct method of production that required a new legislative and/or regulatory framework. The data have not, however, produced consistent insights to account for the variation between high and medium levels of development and the associated differences in the change of production (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section).
In the initial formation of the Texas's policy toward UGD, the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) -the agency responsible for oil and gas regulation -deemed UGD to be fundamentally the same as conventional oil and gas operations, and therefore entitled it to the same permitting procedures. It would be wrong, however, to presume that UGD in Texas is unregulated. Indeed, the conditions for permits in Texas vary considerably around the state depending on local geology, proximity to population centers, and signed into law Act 13, legislation that introduced a so-called "Impact Fee" that allows a county or municipality to impose a fee on unconventional gas wells.
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It ensures that the communities most affected by drilling receive the largest part of the revenues, an approach that departs from traditional severance taxes with distribution of funds by state authorities. In exchange for the revenues from the Impact Fee, Act 13 sought to restrict the zoning rights of municipalities and make the state the sole regulator of UGD. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania later overruled this provision. 3 8 Act 13 does not treat UGD as distinct from conventional natural gas development but some incrementally stronger environmental protections were included (e.g., farther setback requirements at drilling sites). The high cumulative amount of natural gas withdrawals in Colorado can be related to the initial application of the existing oil and gas rules to UGD. However, regulatory overhauls in 2008 and 2012 have, in effect, created a new regulatory system for UGD that may be related to the falling rate of production in Colorado that began around 2010. MOSt recently, some cities in Colorado have sought to prohibit fracking through ballot propositions, which is a departure from the traditional view of oil and gas regulation as a state-level matter. In November 2012 the city of Longmont banned fracking, but the ban was declared invalid by a Boulder County District Court judge based on a conflict with the state's regulation and interests.
3 9 In November 2013, multiple cities -Fort Collins, Boulder, Lafayette, Broomfield -also passed moratoria on fracking while others voted down moratoria.
Michigan's Department of Environmental Quality, which is the main body overseeing oil and gas production, announced in 2013 that it will be working on new rules for UGD that would update existing oil and gas regulation. It is not yet clear whether those rules will simply refine existing permit processes or establish an entirely new system for UGD. Thus, the regulatory situation in Michigan is not readily related to the extent of UGD except that regulatory uncer tainty may be discouraging development.
The Oil and Gas Reform Bill of 2010 (S.B. 165) is the first amendment to Ohio oil and gas law in about 25 years. Rather than create a new regulatory system for UGD, the law expands existing regulation through additional notification requirements and advanced enforcement provisions specific to UGD. The regulation of UGD was further amended in S.B. 315 in 2012 but retains the basic framework in existing law. Finalization of the refined regulatory framework coincides with the boost of UGD in Ohio. Similar to Colorado, Ohio is an important battleground for clarify ing regulatory competences between the state and local authorities. Several attempts were made to ban fracking in Bowling Green and Youngstown. In Ober lin, a small, liberal college town without any fracking activity, a ban was passed 71% to 39%. 40 Our hypothesis is supported by the data from the states with low levels of development. In September 2013, California passed and Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which establishes some of the toughest restrictions on hydraulic fracturing in the country. Prior to this law, there were no specific regulations regarding hydraulic fracturing in the state, as hydraulic fracturing was considered a variant of conventional oil and gas production. The 'permanent' regulation, that is expected to go into effect on January 1, 2015, will introduce a separate permit requirement for UGD under standards that have not yet been issued. The anticipation of restrictive regulation could account for the paucity of development in California.
The new Illinois legislation recognizes distinctive aspects of UGD and focuses on water usage, treatment, and pollution prevention. Thus, the law prohibits the developer from storing wastewater in openair ponds, requires the developer to carry out baseline and post-operational surface and groundwater tests, compels the developer to formulate fresh water withdrawal and management plans for the whole chain of UGD operations, and requires disclosure of the chemicals used during drilling operations. 41 The law also contains a variety of features that may discourage investments in UGD: anyone (also from outside the state) can appeal permits and initiate lawsuits when they suspect a permit may be invalid; developers must pay third parties to test water quality; and each recipient of a permit must pay $13500 and the wellhead tax is relatively high (6% of the value of produced oil and gas). In 2010, Governor David Paterson (D) of New York State determined that UGD should be treated as a distinct operation from conventional oil and gas development and, hence, under Executive Order 41, the practice required further environmental review.
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This designation provided an opportunity for opponents of UGD to argue for a moratorium, since a complete environmental and public health review of UGD had not been conducted. 43 The New York State Assembly enacted a two-year moratorium in March of 2013, thereby allowing more time for completion of additional health and environmental studies. The Governor of New York (Andrew Cuomo), who faced re-election in 2014, indicated that he will make a decision on UGD for the State when the Commissioner of Health completes his review.
Economic distress
An analysis of the relation between economic distress and the level of UGD yields mixed results (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section). Additionally, while there is some evidence that economic distress at the county level is related to UGD, we find that economic need is not a decisive determinant of UGD, especially when economic needs are concentrated in only a few communities that do not have the decision-making power to permit or encourage development.
On a statewide basis, Texas is clearly in need of economic development but, at the county level, there does not seem to be a consistent pattern (see Table 5 ). 44 The top ten natural gas producing counties in Texas have widely varying economic conditions. Six of ten counties (60%) have median household incomes below the statewide median, three of ten 
IRGC, Risk Governance Guidelines for Unconventional Gas
Development, supra note 10, at p. 32.
44 Here and in the following, the data on the economic distress measures was obtained from the American Community Survey (5-year estimates) via the "Community Facts" data base from the "American Fact Finder" by feeding in a state or county and drawing the data from the categories "Income" and "Poverty". Cf. U.S.
Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates, via "American Fact Finder", "Community Facts", available on the Internet at <http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/ pages/index.xhtml> (last accessed on 9 May 2014). (30%) have unemployment rates above the statewide average, and two of ten (20%) have a higher poverty rate. The lack of a consistent pattern could be a par tial result of the recent stimulus that has been provided by UGD in terms of job creation. The statewide indicators for Pennsylvania do not show severe economic distress, but the counties where UGD has occurred are in strong need of economic development. In the seven counties that were top Impact Fee receivers in 2012,45 six have median household income below the statewide median. The unemployment rate in only one out of seven counties (14%) is above the statewide average but four of the seven counties (57%) have above average pover ty rates. A 2013 report suggests that these counties may already be influenced by the economic stimulus provided by UGD.
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Similarly, evidence of economic distress at the state and especially at the county levels is present in Ohio. In the 36 counties of Ohio where unconventional gas is produced, median household income is below the statewide average in 26 counties (72%), the rate of unemployment is above the statewide average in 17 counties (47%), and the rate of poverty is above the statewide average in 19 counties (52%).
The data from Colorado do not correspond with our hypothesis at the state level but there is evidence at the county level. Of the 17 counties where UGD is occurring, 13 (76%) have median household incomes below the statewide median, six (35%) have unemployment rates above the statewide average, and lo (59%) have rates of poverty above the statewide average. The countylevel figures may reflect some stimulus from UGD. The Michigan data do not clearly support the hypothesis. There is strong evidence of economic distress at the state and at the county levels, and the state has significant UGD. However, the unconventional gas production in Michigan is falling. Median household income in Michigan is about 9% below the national median, while unemployment and poverty rates are well above the national average. In the 18 counties of Michigan where UGD occurs, 16 have median household income below the statewide median (89%), 13 (72%) have a rate of unemployment above the statewide average, and 11 (61%) have rates of poverty above the statewide figure. UGD did not develop significantly in Michigan until after these data were collected.
Analysis of California's data provides mixed evidence. California is a relatively prosperous state, which is consistent with the lack of perceived need for UGD. However, some of the counties with UGD potential indicate high levels of economic distress: eight in lo (8o%) have median household incomes below the statewide average, and a majority has above average unemployment and poverty rates (6o% and 70% respectively). Since the amount of UGD that is underway in California is negligible, these figures are not influenced by UGD.
In Illinois and New York, potential natural gas production is concentrated in several economically de- Although Illinois regulation permits UGD, there is a de-facto moratorium at this time because administrative rules have yet to be formulated on the basis of the enacted law. Illinois's Joint Committee on the Administrative Rules (JCAR), which has a final say on the administrative rules, does not include a representative from Southern Illinois communities. In contrast, northeastern metropolitan areas, which tend to oppose UGD, are well represented on JCAR.
Thus, Illinois's southern communities do not have the power to determine the outcome of the regulatory activities.
Public opinion
Contrary to our initial expectations, our findings support a mixed relation between public opinion and the level of development (see in Annex a "Summary"-box to this section). Public opinion research for the years [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] show that, with the exception of Califor nia and Southern Illinois, a majority of the public in the selected states was generally supportive of fracking (see Table 6 ). Even in New York, where the legislature introduced a moratorium on development in 2013, a large segment of public opinion appears to be supportive of UGD.
Public opinion in California is opposed to UGD. This, together with the low development in this state, supports our hypothesis.
The majority of the respondents in Ohio and in Michigan show fairly strong support for UGD. A 2012 poll by Quinnipiac shows that 64% of Ohioans polled are in favor and 29% are opposed to fracking, the largest difference (35%) between those in favor and those against of all the states analyzed for this paper. The generally positive public opinion, together with a rapid rate of development, supports our hypothesis. However, Michigan, with an approval rate of 54% for fracking (35% opposition rate), shows a declining rate of production. This is not consistent with our hypothesis.
The large margin between those supporting and opposing fracking in Colorado (+17%) and Pennsylvania (ranging from +21 to +28%) is consistent with the significant UGD in these states. One potential reason behind the high approval are the employment figures in both states: employment in the oil and gas industry in Colorado in 2011 was 6.7%, or 213000 jobs; in Pennsylvania, it was 4.7%, which translates to 339000 jobs.
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The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute polled the Southern Illinois region, which showed an almost even split between those supporting and opposing fracking technology. However, the large percentage of those who polled "no opinion" (20%), and the fact that lo% of them admitted to not having heard or landowners mineral rights (and with them a share of the profits), and a unique market that incorporates a multitude of small and mid-sized independent companies to facilitate development. 50 Duplicating the U.S. shale gas experience in Europe would be a challenging endeavor, but there are technical, political, and economic factors in some specific European countries that may encourage UGD. In our study we showed a vast heterogeneity in the level and pace of UGD among eight selected U.S. states. By advancing eight hypotheses, we explored a set of political, social, economic, and technical attributes that can account the variation of UGD experiences. Our analysis shows that the availability of proved reserves, infrastructure, and supportive regulatory environment are three preconditions that facilitate UGD. This finding is generalizable to other geographical contexts and other energy developments. However, whereas the lack of reserves and infrastructure can hinder or prevent development, abundant reserves and developed infrastructure do not guarantee development. Political, economic, and social factors need to be accounted for in order to explain the viability of UGD programs. Thus, we assume that the relation between the history of conventional gas development and UGD that was supported by our analysis results not only from the availability of infrastructure but also from a variety of socio-political factors: familiarity, tolerance for industry, and less developed 'NIMBY'-like attitudes in the population. 1 Indeed, the increase of opposition toward fracking in parts of Colorado may be related to the growth of residents who recently moved to Colorado from other states where oil and gas development is not prevalent or familiar. The history of conventional gas development may also have a facilitating effect on extending existing regulatory frameworks to UGD -a factor that seems to encourage development, according to our analysis. Our findings on pro-environmental sentiments, which are clearly inversely related to UGD, did contain a surprise: high environmental scores in Michigan and Colorado were accompanied by significant although falling -rates of production. Further, the data on the 'public opinion'-hypothesis indicate -although not consistently -a relation between positive attitudes and high levels of UGD, though it seems that lack of awareness is widespread. Similar to the assumptions about the availability of reserves and in-frastructure, positive public attitude is not a sufficient driver for the development, as we can observe from the New York State case.
Contrary to our expectations, the 'political party'-hypothesis did not produce consistent results. Republican Party control of the legislature and Gover nor's office in Michigan has not reversed the falling rates of production. The Democratic Party does not always act to depress UGD. In fact, Pennsylvania's boost of production in its early phase was facilitated by the Democratic Governor Ed Rendell, and Colorado's Democratic Governor John Hickenlooper has been a key supporter of UGD.
Finally, our data provide mixed support for the hy pothesis that economic distress explains interstate variation in the level of UGD. Even though the more prosperous states tend to have little UGD (California, Illinois and New York), there are specific counties in these states that have potential for UGD and that are in economic distress. Such counties may simply lack political influence at the state level.
We encourage future research to examine the entire 32 states in the USA where UGD is considered promising. Detailed comparisons of the European and U.S. geological contexts, legal and political systems, and economic conditions would also be worthwhile. Since the levels of UGD are changing over time in ways that are nuanced, researchers need to develop indices of inducement or restrictiveness that can be used to quantify rigorously a jurisdiction's posture toward UGD. 5 2 Future research should also address the availability of flowback water treatment facilities as an important piece of infrastructure that can facilitate or hinder UGD -especially so for EU nationstate borders that could be less receptive to cross-bor der shipments of fracking waste. We also encourage quantitative cross-factorial analysis that aims at exploring relations between the independent variables, with the goal of clustering the factors that relate to development or lack thereof. Thus, the data presented here are only the beginning of an exploration of a complex technical and political phenomena. 
